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REACTING TO KERNEL STATE OF LISTENING PORTS FOR FIREWALLING 
 






For the typical operation of a server, programs listen on certain specific ports. 
Firewalls are, among other things, used to block irrelevant traffic from a server to avoid 
bothering the server with traffic not relevant to an application.  Firewalls that are 
programmed inconsistently with the application may mean that unintended (and 
uninteresting) traffic gets to the server and loads its kernel or that the relevant port is 
accidentally blocked and the application does not work.  Techniques presented herein 
provide for the ability to program upstream (e.g., hardware) Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
in a dynamic manner by responding to the shifting use of the network stack by processes 
running on a host. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
During typical server operation, an application will call the Berkeley Software 
Distribution (BSD) socket listen() call to demonstrate to the kernel that an incoming 
connection is accepted. Firewalls, particularly ACLs, are often manually programmed in 
concert with the design of a system so that, for instance, a webserver listening on port 80 
receives packets for port 80 but the firewall rejects packets for other ports, thereby avoiding 
the potential overloading of the kernel with requests that it will simply reject (but that cause 
the kernel to use CPU cycles in the process of determining the action).  Problems can occur 
when the firewall is programmed in a way that is inconsistent with the application, perhaps 
because the design is unclear or because the design is incorrectly implemented or has not 
been updated to reflect the software behavior. 
The kernel knows which ports it is listening on. This information can be extracted 
from the kernel - this is entirely feasible in most kernels, as can be seen from the output of 
'netstat -ant'.  Techniques herein propose to use this information and consume it in a system 
that determines what ACLs to program on devices upstream of a server.  Figure 1, below, 
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Figure 1: Example System 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, an automated system of this nature would involve an 
agent receiving the kernel's listening port state (e.g., as shown at 1 and 2 of Figure 1) and 
updating ACLs in the Network Processor Unit (NPU) of a piece of hardware or in the ACL 
tables of an interstitial piece of firewalling software (e.g., as shown at 3 of Figure 1) to 
respond by, for instance, allowing packets for which the kernel is listening (e.g., as shown 
at 4A or Figure 1) and discarding or blocking all other packets (e.g., as shown at 4B of 
Figure 1. 
In this manner, the NPU that can implement ACLs efficiently and at low cost will 
block unexpected and therefore undesirable packets from reaching the kernel running on 
the server, and save the server from doing any work on these undesirable packets. The 
firewall, since it is now automatically programmed, will always reflect the software 
behavior, so it can never be programmed to be inconsistent with the software. 
In some instances, this technique could be refined to identify specific behaviors for 
listening ports associated with specific processes (which, once more, can be identified or 
seen from the output of 'sudo netstat -antp'). For instance, in a webserver it may be desirable 
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to listen not only for external Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests but also for 
internal Representational State Transfer (REST or RESTful) requests to a host-monitoring 
agent.  By using both the process and the port, specific ACL rules can be determined for 
listening ports associated with the HTTP daemon (e.g., if process == httpd, assign an ACL 
of allow-all to the listening port) and, separately, for the monitoring agent (e.g., if process 
== monitor-agent, assign an ACL of allow-from-NOC to the listening port). 
In both cases the ACLs would be dynamic. For instance, consider an example in 
which File Transfer Protocol (FTP) listens on an inbound second port for data connections 
and this listen() would cause the ACLs to be updated with no awareness of the high level 
behavior of process or content of the protocol.   
In still some instances, the ACL itself could be a default-deny in the system or it 
could issue a 'connection refused' reply for non-matching traffic, as may suit the 
preferences of an operator. 
Although per application firewalling rules may be known, techniques herein 
provide for the ability to automatically control external devices based on properties 
extracted from the kernel without having to force the application to add behavior. In 
accordance with techniques presented herein, the application itself does not ask for a 
firewall to be removed for a port and this may not address the use case in which firewall 
rules are expressed by either an application developer or one that deploys the application 
in a manner that mirrors the application's listening ports (which, as we point out, are prone 
to flaws and inconsistencies). Rather, techniques herein provide for identifying, without 
intervention from either an application developer or one that deploys the application, that 
ports are not open and can be blocked, or that ports are open and should permit traffic. 
Regarding listen() tracing, techniques herein could be enhanced to use an extended 
Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) program to perform lower-level filtering on a host, thereby 
adapting the behavior for a program based on open ports. However, eBPF typically does 
not provide for the ability to control an external device; rather, it is a lower level software 
behavior within the kernel (or, at best, within the smart network interface card (NIC)).  
In contrast, techniques herein provide that ports that should be opened on an 
external device are directly related to ports that should be listening.  Stated differently, if a 
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port is not listening for a connection, then it is not useful to receive traffic on the port, so 
at best, only traffic for which there is a listening port should be permitted.   
Central to the techniques herein, it is proposed that such filtering is typically not 
performed on a server.  If a packet has already arrived at server, resources may already be 
wasted by running an eBPF filter.  In contrast, techniques herein propose to learn 
information indicating which ports are open (without application involvement) and forward 
the information that a port is closed to any external devices exist to facilitate filtering before 
packets reach the server; thus, avoiding the use of server resources by blocking the packet 
earlier in its path. 
Regarding state tracking, such techniques typically involve tracking the state of 
connections once those connections are established, but typically do not adapt to 
information regarding which connections would be permitted to be established. If 
something external attempts to connect to a port, a typical state tracking rule deny the 
connection–for all ports, whether they are open or closed.  Thus, such state tracking is 
typically used to track outbound connections, which is outside the scope of the techniques 
presented herein, which involve an on-server filter that facilitates filtering on external 
network devices. 
Regarding Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), as is often utilized in home gaming 
systems, UPnP requires an application to be aware that it going to need a listening port and 
to ask for a port to be opened on the other side of a, typically Network Address Translation 
(NAT) based home gateway, router.  Thus, UPnP requires active participation of an 
application for a reason.  For a home gateway, it is typically not desirable to open ports on 
the outside of a home network just because an application desires to listen for connections 
because 'I am listening for connections' means 'I am listening for local connections' by 
default and it makes sense for the application to have to jump through a separate hoop to 
say 'and I will also allow internet connections'. 
In contrast, techniques of this proposal are not intended for this use case, but rather 
may be applicable to in-data center (in-DC) or in-cloud use cases in which resources can 
be preserved on a server where a listening port means, 'I am listening for connections for 
any server that can reach me' without distinction; but even in that case, a server that 
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attempts to connect to a closed port may be wasting resources on the listening server when 
it makes the attempt. 
In some instances, the information learned from the server (e.g., 'I am listening') 
could be combined with other policy information (e.g., 'port X is reachable from address 
range Y') to provide more comprehensive rule construction for external devices, however, 
the initial level (e.g., 'port X is pointless to talk to so let's drop all data aimed at it') is useful 
by itself. 
It is useful when ports are blocked in a fabric scenario such that a server will not 
process traffic on blocked ports, need not respond with 'this port is closed' (the usual 
behavior), or make an active choice to ignore a packet (e.g., per an iptables rule or an eBPF 
programming rule).  The server does not have to expend resources on traffic for a port if 
the traffic if it is blocked earlier in its path. Server resources are expensive, so this has 
considerable value. 
Additionally, there is also no need to add rules manually to the fabric to implement 
this behavior, which would be automatic utilizing the techniques of this proposal, and the 
rules will be consistent since the fabric is following along with the server's needs, deduced 
from information provided to the kernel from an application in the process of using the 
BSD socket Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) in a normal manner and without 
code changes to the application. Thus, the behavior can be guaranteed to be consistent with 
the application's wishes.  In summary, techniques presented herein provide for the ability 
to program upstream (e.g., hardware) ACLs in a dynamic manner by responding to the 
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